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While the continuing proliferation  of CCTV surveillance is a cause for concern, its 
impact on privacy has in the past been mitigated by certain natural limitations on     
the way CCTV systems operate in practice. In particular, the increased quantity of 
surveillance data has not been  matched by a similar increase in our ability to process 
and evaluate it. This paper compares different models of technology enabled analysis 
of CCTV footage, with a focus on the emerging trend of crowdsourced CCTV analysis: 
In the world of crowdsourced surveillance, “Big Brother is us”. 
      
1 The Return of the Native 
In 2009, I reported in my first ever contribution for DuD on  
the continuing love affair of the British government, British 
police and also the wider  British public with CCTV surveil-
lance.1 A year earlier, and Marie-Theres Tinnefeld and Judith 
Rauhofer had analysed in this journal the legal and ethical 
implications of another aspect of surveillance that is more 
prominent in the UK than in (contemporary)  Germany, the 
involvement of  the wider public as “crime spotters”, or “sen-
sors” of the surveillance society.2  Indeed, from the old fash-
ioned “Neighbourhood watch” to the ubiquitous anonymous 
telephone helplines offered by the police for informing on all 
types of social ills, from benefits cheats to suspected terrorists, 
no analysis of surveillance in the UK would be complete with-
out also discussing  the role of citizen involvement in surveil-
lance activities. Long before the term was coined in 2006 by 
Wired magazine writer Jeff Howe, “crowdsourcing” of surveil-
lance played a crucial role in the UK’s crime detection and 
deterrence strategy. This paper will bring these two ideas to-
gether, by analysing the privacy implications of a new tech-
nology assisted “business model” for the analysis of CCTV 
data that relies on members of the public to monitor and ana-
lyse the feed of CCTV cameras. It will argue that some of the 
existing legal and technological limitations of privacy intru-
sion through CCTV are rendered moot in this approach, raising 
some important legal-conceptual questions on the regulation of 
surveillance technology. 
The idea that participating in surveillance constitutes a civic 
virtue is by no means restricted to the UK. As we will see, 
Canada and the US too have promoted the civic aspect of 
surveillance as crime deterrent. Rauhofer and Tinnefeld argued 
that the different attitude to citizen-led surveillance in the UK 
                                                             
1 Schafer 'Schlafwandelnd in den Überwachungsstaat?' (2009) Datenschutz 
und Datensicherheit Vol. 8 pp 483-489 
2 Tinnefeld/Rauhofer,  'Whistleblower: Verantwortliche Mitarbeiter oder 
Denunzianten? Fragen im Feld von Ethikrichtlinien, des Datenschutzes und 
der Mitbestimmung’' (2008) Datenschutz und Datensicherheit Vol. 32, No. 11, 
pp. 717-723 
and Germany can be explained by the experience with the 
abuse of informer systems under both, the Nazi regime and the 
GDR. Social acceptance of informers, so their thesis, is more 
acceptable in societies where the social contract between gov-
ernment and citizenship has never resulted in manifest abuse, 
posing inherent cultural challenges for any attempt at top-
down legal harmonisation of privacy regimes. 
In a follow-up paper in this journal,3 I indicated  that while 
this is an important aspect of differences in attitude to surveil-
lance, there is in addition another cultural trajectory  that al-
lows a more positive interpretation of  the Anglo-American 
approach. From their  perspective, the professionalization of 
policing in continental Europe is itself a potential threat to 
liberty, born from the centralist and autocratic  approach to  
governance that merged the absolutist state with Napoleonic 
administration, and a system  of a uniformed police that grew 
out of the military.4 In these systems, the police acts as direct 
representative of the crown, and is imbued with special rights 
that other citizens do not have. From the UK perspective, the 
strict separation between a professional police and the citizen-
ry is also indicative of the “Obrigkeitsstaat”.  By contrast, the 
historical  narrative that we find in the UK, which provides a 
basis of the legitimacy also of the modern  police, is intention-
ally juxtaposed to this continental European model. At its 
centre is the slow evolution of the police officer from  volunta-
ristic, citizen-driven self-regulation to the “citizen  in uniform” 
of today. Going back to the time before the Norman conquest, 
we find a “citizen proto-police” in the laws enacted by Alfred 
the Great. In particular, the pursuit of a suspect became a gen-
eral obligation owed to the crown by all citizens, the law of  
“Hue and Cry”.5 Correspondingly, all citizens had a right to 
arrest a felon – the citizen arrest, based in common law and 
                                                             
3 Schafer.  'All changed, changed utterly? Privacy protection in post-Labour 
Britain' (2011) Datenschutz und Datensicherheit Vol 35 pp. 634-638 
4 In a similar vein on the cultural barriers to legal harmonisation see 
Legrand,  "European legal systems are not converging." International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 45.01 (1996): 52-81. 
5 Rawlings,  Policing before the Police. In T. Newborn, Handbook of Polic-
ing, Wilan  Publishing, Cullompton, (2009) p. 47-72 
now codified under section 24A of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984.  Just how influential  this system was on   
the attitude towards policing can be seen by the fact that more 
than 800 years later, “Hue and Cry” became the name of the 
first police gazette,  first issued in 1772 by John Fielding, one 
of the driving forces behind the modern, professional police 
force in the UK. In modern terms, the Gazette was an early 
police Intranet – publishing mainly  notices of wanted crimi-
nals with requests for information, including information about 
possible rewards.  
 
2 A pair of blue eyes 
In a society where every citizen had both the duty and the 
right to act in policing functions, professionalising the police 
and endowing officers with rights not held by other citizens 
was never going to be an easy task. Consequently, voluntarism 
remained a constant feature of policing in the UK, with a mod-
ern police force that evolved only slowly and gradually  from 
community based (self)policing. At every step, widespread 
public distrust, together with  powerful opposition from groups 
outside the capital and its political networks, had to be over-
come.  
After the Norman conquest, the office of “constable” was 
created, an official under the control of local magistrates. We 
find an early description of a constable in the writing of the 
medieval jurist  Bracton:  
“In whatever way they come and on whatever day, it is the 
duty of the constable to enrol everything in order, for he has 
record as to the things he sees; but he cannot judge, because 
there is no judgment at the Tower, since there the third ele-
ment of a judicial proceeding is lacking, namely a judge and 
jurisdiction. He has record as to matters of fact, not matters 
of judgment and law”.  
This means that the constable was lacking any powers a citizen 
would  not also have, in particular no separate powers of ar-
rest. From a surveillance perspective though, he was charged 
particularly with being the “eyes and ears" of the local court – 
though  independent of the central government. For the centu-
ries that followed, parish constables, part time, unpaid and 
typically elected by the local parishioners, dominate the scene 
of policing in the UK6. This system of elected, unpaid parish 
constables continued in England until the 19th century. It was 
only then, and again with considerable opposition from both 
lower class citizens (who feared that they were the main target 
of this development) and powerful gentry outside London, 
who feared a power grab by central government. The result 
was also, patchwork evolution of the citizen-proto officer to a 
professional police force. In London the  Metropolitan Police 
was formed by the Metropolitan Police Act 1829, and outside 
London by the County Police Act 1839. However, this act only 
permitted counties to establish full-time professional police 
forces, it did not make it mandatory. To address widespread 
concern, these acts also made it clear that the new police was 
to be a police under the rule of law – with officers who did not 
                                                             
6 Guth,  (1994). "The Traditional Common Law Constable, 1235-1829: 
From Bracton to the Fieldings to Canada". In Macleod, R.C.; Schneiderman, 
David. Police Powers in Canada: The Evolution and Practice of Authority. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
necessarily have more powers than an ordinary citizen, but 
were held in the execution of these duties to a higher standard 
than the people they policed.  
One particular reminder of the voluntaristic origin of 
the modern British police can be seen in the “special consta-
ble”, citizens who volunteer to take on part time, unpaid police 
work. In the same year as a  professional police force  was 
finally created,  Parliament also passed "An act for amending 
the laws relative to the appointment of Special Constables, and 
for the better preservation of the Police"7. In  1835 Special 
Constabulary was defined as a volunteer organisation. The 
modern special police constable finally was defined in law in 
World War 1 - with a special role at the time to protect  water 
supplies from German infiltrators.8  
While the historical accuracy of this “Sonderweg” of 
policing in the UK has to be treated with some care, it symbol-
ic function for the understanding of the role of the police, and 
the source of its legitimacy, must not be underestimated. In 
popular understanding, policing in Britain has a dual aspect – 
the police officer is a mere “citizen in uniform”, and converse-
ly, every citizen is potentially an “officer in plain cloth”. Both 
aspects are integral for ensuring that the police can’t become 
an oppressive force – and cooperating with it, by e.g. on in-
forming crime, is therefore not so much a collusion with an 
authority that is already conceptualised as juxtaposed to the 
ordinary citizen, but a way of ensuring that it remains rooted in 
the community it is meant to police. In the remainder of this 
paper, we will see how this duality plays out in the field of 
CCTV surveillance, a technology which can both undermine 
and reinforce this understanding of the legitimacy of the po-
lice.   
  
3 Far from the Madding Crowd 
 While the continuing  proliferation of CCTV surveillance is a 
cause for  concern, its impact on privacy has in the past  been 
mitigated by certain natural limitations on  the way CCTV 
systems  operate in practice. In particular, the increased quanti-
ty of surveillance systems has not been matched by a similar 
increase in our ability to process and evaluate the data that is 
generated by them. In Scotland alone, the number of CCTV 
cameras has trebled in the last decade, while the number of 
people employed to monitor them has remained stable. If we 
take an average system with 20 cameras providing around the 
clock surveillance, a staggering 480 hours of video footage or  
43 million images are created every single  day.9  This creates 
considerable costs in personnel, as the  number of screens that 
can be effectively monitored by one person is limited. While 
best practice would require not more than two screens per 
individual at any given time, some  have had one operator 
responsible for more than 50 screens on a 12-hour shift.10 As a 
result, many cameras are not monitored at all, even when the 
                                                             
7 http://www.policespecials.com/history.html 
8 Gill,/ Mawby,  (1990). A Special Constable: a study of the police reserve. 
Aldershot: Avebury 
9 Surette, R. (2005) "The thinking eye: Pros and cons of second generation 
CCTV surveillance systems", Policing: An International Journal of Police 
Strategies & Management, Vol. 28 Iss: 1, pp.152 - 173 
10 Clarke (1994), "Blind eye on the street?", Police Review, August, pp.29-
39. 
technological ability exists.11 In addition, a significant number 
of cameras is operated by private individuals, typically shop-
keepers who install them mainly as a response to the demands 
by insurance companies. The quality of the images that are 
recorded is low, tapes are reused frequently, resulting in an 
implementation of the “right to be forgotten” by operational 
default, and most of the images are therefore never seen by a 
human eye. While the density of CCTV surveillance in the UK 
is higher than in any other country, counting the mere number 
of cameras paints therefore a misleading picture. Even CCTV 
with “man in the loop”, where live feeds are transmitted to an 
adequately staffed operation centre, faces the problem that 
continuous surveillance of the data finds its limits in the hu-
man ability to cope with boredom and over-exposure to infor-
mation. In this situation, the operator “sees” the individuals on 
screen, but loses the ability to identify or recognise them, or to 
categorise their behaviour correctly.12  
Dealing with an  ever increasing amount of data whose anal-
ysis is a highly repetitive, labour intensive task is a typical 
scenario for Artificial Intelligence solutions. If we can compu-
tationally model the analytic abilities of the best CCTV opera-
tor at his or her peak, we can replace human operators at least 
for the pre-processing of the material, leaving human judge-
ments reserved for those situations that have been identified 
automatically as worthy of more detailed attention. This over-
comes the limitations set by the storage and retrieval capacity 
of  human memory  and our low boredom thresholds.  One 
approach to tackle the relative underuse of CCTV images has 
therefore been unsurprisingly  the development of more intel-
ligent image interpretation and data mining tools.  
The earliest examples of AI enhanced CCTV surveillance 
modelled global properties of crowds,  such as the density and 
flow of crowds of pedestrians in rail-stations during ‘rush-
hours’. A camera that “understands” for instance how a typical 
crowd moves after a train reaches the station can then alert a 
human operator when the actually observed movements vary 
from those predicted, for instance when a panic results in a 
sudden rush of bodies.13 These  techniques did not identify 
individuals, – rather, average properties of the typical crowd 
where modelled, just as the theory of idealised gases for in-
stance models not the individual trajectory of molecules, but 
treats the gas as one single entity.14 
Once the behaviour of a crowd is computationally captured, 
the logical next step is to contrast the behaviour of individuals 
against that crowd. A single person moving in the opposite 
direction from the main flow can be as much reasons for con-
cern (e.g. a pickpocket, or a mother separated from her chil-
dren) as an individual who stays much longer than the average 
person at the same place (indicating e.g. a drug dealer in a 
subway station).  From this, the logical next step lead to the 
identification of individuals, and automated categorisation of 
                                                             
11 Norris/ Armstrong,  (1999), The Maximum Surveillance Society: The 
Rise of CCTV, Berg, Oxford, p. 210-211 
12 Davies,/ Thasen, (2000), "Closed circuit television: how effective an 
identification air?", British Journal of Psychology, Vol. 91 pp.411-26 
13 Velastin/Yin/ Davies/ Vicencio- Silva/ Allsop/ Penn, “Automated meas-
urement of crowd density and motion using image processing,” 7th Int. Conf. 
on Road Traffic Monitoring and Control, London,  
1994, pp. 127-132. 
14 Davies/ Velastin,  (2005). A progress review of intelligent CCTV surveil-
lance systems. Proc. IEEE IDAACS, 417-423; for a legal analysis see also 
Gerrit Hornung und Monika Desoi, "Smart Cameras" und automatische 
Verhaltensanalyse, Kommunikation und Recht, 153-158, März 2011. 
their activities. Second generation CCTV will therefore have 
the ability to detect the presence of people,  track individuals  
across  multiple cameras, and to analyse individual behaviour. 
This should allow automated  identification of wanted fugi-
tives, identify automatically behaviour (an arm pointing per-
pendicular from the body at another person e.g. is a “red flag” 
for a robbery with a gun), and object recognition, e.g. when a 
person leaves a possible bomb behind in an airport environ-
ment.15  
From a privacy perspective, this automated analysis of im-
ages is a double edged sword. On the one hand, it increases the 
utility of data, and with that also increases the possibility of its  
abuse. Police officers could for instance in principle query  the 
data held cumulatively in the CCTV centres of a city so that 
the software first identifies the faces of participants at a lawful 
demonstration, and then traces back the journey they took to 
reach the demonstration, identifying in the process their home 
addresses, or where they dropped off their children for school.  
On the other hand, automated data processing addresses one 
of the most frequent concerns found in the UK population, the 
inherent voyeurism of CCTV surveillance. While approving of 
CCTV in principle, concerns have been raised about human 
operators training  the cameras on windows, restrooms, „fun-
ny“ looking people, or certain  parts of the (mostly female) 
anatomy. 16  The psychological effect of the „voyeuristic 
gaze“17, rather than an intellectual concern about data misuse, 
features foremost in concerns about CCTV.  This  means also 
that the smaller the number of human operators, the less intru-
sive the technology is perceived to be. 
There is a third, less discussed and more unexpected nega-
tive effect of CCTV surveillance.  Criminological theories of 
crime reduction that focus on routine activities theories of 
crime emphasise the importance of “guardianship”, informal 
social surveillance conducted by residents of shared public 
spaces.18 CCTV is feared by some to reduce the incentive for 
citizens to exercise  guardianship, by limiting their “stake” in 
public spaces.19 As Groombridge and Murjui put it:  
“Instead of worrying about “Big Brother” watching them, 
the public may perceive that “big father” has sorted every-
thing out.”20 
We have argued above that the UK police derives its legitima-
cy also from the notion of the citizen in uniform, and the po-
licemen in every civilian. In the long run, loss of  guardianship 
has therefore the potential to undermine this legitimating func-
tion. With this, finally, we can move on to a different model of 
using CCTV surveillance, one that puts the human element 
firmly back into the picture.  
 
                                                             
15 Davis, (2001), Real Time Computer Surveillance for Crime Detection, 
National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC 
16 a comprehensive analysis is in Surette, R. (1985), "Video street patrol: 
media technology and street crime", Journal of Police Science and Admin-
istration, Vol. 13 pp.78-85 
17 South, (1987), "The security and surveillance of the environment", in 
Lowman, J., Menzies, R., Pays, T. (Eds),Transcarceration: Essays in the 
Sociology of Social Control, Gower, Aldershot, pp.129-52. 
18 Cohen,/Felson,  (1979), "Social change and crime rate trends: a routine 
activities approach", American Sociological Review, Vol. 44 pp.588-608 
19 Fyfe, (1996), "City watching: closed circuit television surveillance in pub-
lic spaces", Area, Vol. 28 No.1, pp.37-46. 
20 Groombridge/ Murji,  (1994), "As easy as AB and CCTV", Policing, Vol. 
10 No.4, pp.283-90 
4 A cloud of many-coloured idealities 
In the previous section, we have seen a traditional AI approach 
for  the problem of data overload. By modelling the skills of 
the best human CCTV operators, the aim is to make their ex-
pertise available if and when needed. While this approach to 
knowledge engineering gained prominence in the early days of 
the computer revolution, the emergence of the internet has 
made an alternative model available. Rather than building 
monolithic expert systems, it is now much easier, and often 
also much cheaper, to find all the needed expertise on the web, 
where it is furthermore often offered for free. We see this in 
Wikipedia, where people donate their time and knowledge for 
a collective endeavour, or in projects such as SETI at home, 
where participants donate processing power of their computers 
to analyse data from radio telescopes. “Crowdsourcing” and 
“virtual volunteering” are technology enabled methods to 
harness the contribution of large number of people, dispersed 
over a large geographic area, for shared goals. This can also 
result in a division of labour where boring or repetitive tasks 
are split up into smaller, more manageable parcels, for instance 
when proofreading scanned copies of works of literature for 
Project Gutenberg, or carrying out routine science work in the 
field of data analytics. 21  Jeff Howe’s original definition of  
"crowdsourcing" is of interest in this context:  
 
"Simply defined, crowdsourcing represents the act of 
a company or institution taking a function once per-
formed by employees and outsourcing it to an unde-
fined (and generally large) network of people in the 
form of an open call. This can take the form of peer-
production (when the job is performed collaborative-
ly), but is also often undertaken by sole individuals. 
The crucial prerequisite is the use of the open call  
format and the large network of potential laborers.” 
 
 As the definition shows, while the participation of the crowd 
can be on a volunteer basis, it is also possible  to  develop 
commercial business models based on this idea. This gave rise 
of a new job profile: the “clickworker” is self-employed, offers 
his services online and typically works together with many 
thousands of others on small parts of a larger project, co-
ordinated by a computer.22 One of the best known examples is 
Amazon’s “Mechanical Turk”, a name that also indicates that 
crowd sourcing sees itself indeed in the tradition of Artificial 
Intelligence research: the original Mechanical Turk was a 
(fraudulent) precursor of a robot capable of playing chess. 
Computer programmers co-ordinate through the Mechnical 
Turk  the use of human intelligence to perform tasks that com-
puters are currently unable to do, but which don’t merit to 
employ full time staff.  Clickworker.com is another such plat-
form that provides a “virtual workforce, worldwide and on 
demand”. Interestingly for our context, one of the  jobs they 
offer is “Categorization and tagging of your video and audio 
content, as well as image materials.“23 The implications for the 
problem of data analysis from CCTV cameras should by now 
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sive data analysis tasks." Lunar and Planetary Science 1 (2001) 
22 See e.g. Ickler,  (2012). Wertschöpfung durch webbasierte kollektive 
Intelligenz. BoD–Books on Demand. 
23http://www.clickworker.com/en/  
be obvious: rather than making the cameras more intelligent, 
disperse the monitoring task across as wide a crowd as possi-
ble. Because every observer only watches as much of the foot-
age as he or she chooses, the problem of boredom and atten-
tion shift can be addressed. If the CCTV footage is streamed 
online, typically on a cloud based server, people from different 
time zones will monitor the footage, which enables around the 
clock coverage. 
 The idea to crowdsource the monitoring of CCTV 
streams online was  pioneered in applications other than crime 
prevention or detection. TV nature programmes such as the 
BBC’s “Autumnwatch” and wildlife publishers such as Na-
tional Geographic began to provide life streams of webcam 
footage from cameras placed in the wild  online. The potential 
of entertainment is often combined with more serious scientific 
purposes, as this approach  can recruit an almost unlimited 
number of  volunteers to monitor  around the clock e.g. the 
nests of rare birds,  and so help in their protection.24 Even more 
unusual, though very British,  are the “ghostcams” that have 
been installed in some of the UK’s most “haunted houses”. 
Again, the idea is to provide around the clock monitoring of 
these cameras on the web, on the off chance that they may spot 
an inexplicable phenomenon.25 While not even the most ardent 
of animal rights advocates, 26  or advocates of post mortem 
personality rights for that matter, will be concerned about the 
privacy implications of these applications, their potential for 
surveillance CCTV did not remain unnoticed. After the Lon-
don Riots in 2011, which also saw the use of social media as a 
means to organise large scale criminal activity, the Metropoli-
tan Police showed that it was at least as comfortable with 
social media as the rioters. It  used crowd-sourcing to identify 
people suspected of committing crimes during the events, 
developing a  smartphone app  that gives access to  2,800 
CCTV images taken during the disorder in August. The app 
comes with several data mining features, and can for instance 
order  images by location. The user of the  free “Facewatch ID 
app can then send through an app functionality  name and 
address of any person they identify  to the police. Assistant 
commissioner Mark Rowley:  
 
"This is a great opportunity for the public to help us 
fight crime and bring those who remain outstanding 
to justice. My hope is that the two-thirds of London-
ers who own smartphones will download this app, 
and help us identify people we still need to speak to. 
We need Londoners to browse through the app every 
week or so as new images will appear regularly. This 
is a fantastic way for Londoners to help us to fight 
crime."27 
 
While this revival of the “Hue and Cry” in the age of social 
media only involved images of actual perpetrators,  pre-
screened by the police, and in that sense not conceptually 
different from displaying images of wanted suspects in the 
                                                             
24 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/devon/7388767.stm 
25 An example, provided by a local council, is here: 
http://services.salford.gov.uk/ghostcam/ An Irish version, looking for lepre-
chauns, here ,  http://www.irelandseye.com/leprechaun/webcam.htm 
26 It should be noted though that the webcam monitoring the pandas in Ed-
inburgh zoo was recently switched ff to “ensure privacy during the 26hrs 
window were they can mate”.  
27 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-18589273 
above mentioned police gazette, other applications take the 
idea of crowdsourced, cloud enabled CCTV analysis a step 
further.  In the aftermath of 9/11, Jay Walker, founder of Price-
line.com proposed the „USHomeGuard“ system. 28  Ordinary 
citizens would get paid  $10 an hour to view CCTV footage 
from safety critical installations such as nuclear power stations 
or military installations, in particular at spots where no human 
activity is supposed to take place. Spotters have to register, and 
can then log on to  view  surveillance images.  They would 
then  vote “yes” if there was unusual activity, “no” if nothing 
was happening,  and “maybe” in case of doubt. Every yes vote 
was circulated to a wider group of spotters. If enough also 
voted yes, an auto alert was generated. Randomly inserted fake 
images keep the spotters alert and quality controlled. While 
this proposal ultimately failed to garner enough support from 
the owners of the CCTV installations, more recently a similar 
approach was implemented at the border between Texas and 
Mexico, to combat drug smuggling and illegal immigration.  
The “Texas Virtual Border Watch Program”, an initiative by a 
group of sheriffs from border towns, provided streaming 
CCTV footage, both day and night vision,  on a cloud based 
server,  to enable the public to report suspicious activity via e-
mail.29 Unlike HomeGuard, the challenges for the spotters here 
is to distinguish suspicious from legitimate behaviour, as the 
cameras would routinely also film innocent third parties cross-
ing the border. According to one of the activists behind the 
system, more  than 43,000 people logged on to BlueServo.net, 
the website hosting the footage in the first month alone, “do-
nating” some of their free time scanning streaming video of 
border hot spots and acting as what the Web site calls “Virtual 
Texas Deputies.” However, after initial enthusiasm, the project 
was abandoned when it became clear that data quality was in 
insurmountable problem – including a suspicion that criminals 
were using the technology to predict police raids.  
Undeterred by  this experience, the UK too moved 
from CCTV to OCTV, the Open Circuit TV, in a pilot scheme 
in Shoreditch,  London. Residents were able to  watch CCTV 
cameras on a special TV channel, a project that proved so 
popular with residents that  it gave rise to new commercial 
ventures. One of these is “Internet Eyes”. Presented as an 
‘event notification system’, companies that subscribe to the 
scheme  provide CCTV footage from their security cameras. 
Internet Eyes then act as a broker between the companies and 
people willing to look for a few minutes or hour at the footage, 
not unlike the clickworker businesses described above. While 
the US systems combined  an appeal to patriotism with some 
financial incentive, the UK approach relies on financial incen-
tives together with  the “gamification” of reality30 -  ‘players’ 
not only earn £10 for every correct alert, they also earn  points 
for spotting suspected crimes and lose points for false alarms. 
Correct identifications earn the player an entry into the month-
ly prize draw for up to  £1000. The website of Internet Eye 
contains a reference to the relevant data protection legislation:  
it states in particular that “Payment of the membership fee 
helps prevent misuse of the system and acts as a barrier to 
entry to stop voyeurism. Internet Eyes Ltd. has therefore estab-




30  Huotari/ Hamari. 2012. Defining gamification: a service marketing per-
spective. In Proceeding of the 16th International Academic MindTrek Confer-
ence (MindTrek '12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 
lished a rewards policy as outlined below so that membership 
fees and more can be returned to Viewers.” 
This approach seem to have been successful. Even 
though Internet Eyes was referred to the Data Commissioner, 
only a caution was issued when one of the videos was upload-
ed by a spotter to YouTube. The business model itself re-
mained untouched. We can now see how new technologies do 
indeed disrupt traditional legal concepts, creating normative 
problems in their wake. Neither HomeGuard nor Internet Eye 
publishes CCTV footage on the web – that would be illegal. 
Instead, they hire deputies (US), self-employed clickworkers 
or indeed employees (UK) to process the data on behalf of the 
data controller. Since this serves the original function for 
which the data was collected – crime prevention –  and might 
furthermore be necessary in the light of the data processing 
problems discussed above, this remains formally permissible. 
However, this data protection regimes is  premised on the idea 
that there is a de-facto difference between the public and the 
data processors, the inside of a company charged with a specif-
ic task, and the wider world. Crowdsourcing and clickworking 
calls this inside-outside distinction into question, and thus 
undermines the normative ideal of the law. In a world where it 
takes just the click of the mouse to become “employed” by a 
company, the distinction between employee and public, inside 
and outside world all but collapses.  
 However, it would also be problematic to analyse 
this as just another failure of the DO regime that can be ad-
dressed through legislation. As I argued in the introduction to 
this paper, the notion of the deputy/special constable as civil-
ian in aid of the police, or the idea of a civic duty to act as a 
police officer in times of need, not just to assist them are deep-
ly imbued in the common law “mentality”. What looks for the 
continental observer as just another attempt to play fast and 
loose with private can therefore on closer inspection also been 
seen as an emancipatory act that establishes ownership of 
public spaces, and therefore wrestling  authority away from the 
formal  police. Harmonisation through EU directives, or so I 
argued, finds its limits when fundamental, historically mediat-
ed and contradictory  value judgements of this type are in-
volved.  
  
5 Life’s little Ironies 
As we have seen, there is something deeply ironic about the 
role of CCTV as a surveillance tool. From the fear of a loss of 
guardianship and abdication of duties to Big Brother, OCTV , 
Open Circuit TV and the technologies that underpin it facili-
tate a return of a pre-modern policing model, where everybody 
is a police officer, and the “Hue and Cry” of old becomes the 
“Look and notify” of the internet age. There is one final irony 
though. While I argued that European Union laws find their 
limitations when running against deeply held cultural differ-
ences, regulation through technology remains a viable option 
to protect privacy. Privacy Enhancing Technologies in turn can 
benefit from the crowdsourcing paradigm just as much as 
surveillance technologies do. While some people may find it 
satisfactory to watch CCTV footage from supermarkets to look 
out for shoplifter, we could harness the same instincts for 
privacy protection – for instance by volunteering to obfuscate 
images of faces on Google Earth, another technology where 
the amount of data created presents problems for traditional 
methods of processing. Using crowdsourcing for privacy pro-
tection is as a research field still in its infancy. Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk mentioned above has been used for studies to 
help us better understand privacy risks.31 The ambivalent na-
ture of crowd sourced privacy threats and crowd sourced pri-
vacy protection has also been discussed  for crowdsroucing 
surveillance in the field  of environmental protection.32 So far, 
the most adventurous use of the crowd for privacy protection is 
made in the field of testing PETs. Here, our paper comes full 
circle, with systems that protect us from the prying eye of 
CCTV cameras subject of crowdsourcing evaluation and en-
hancement studies.33 Whatever the outcome of these studies is, 
neither privacy advocates not surveillance experts can over-
look any longer the technological, social and political dimen-
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